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Teaching and Witness in the Life of the Church 
Mike Higton 
 
Introduction 
I am an Anglican systematic or dogmatic theologian; I happen to prefer the 
term ‘doctrinal theologian’. But saying that I’m an Anglican doctrinal 
theologian is a bit like saying, ‘I’m a captain in the Swiss Navy’, or ‘I’m 
Donald Trump’s head of etiquette’ — it’s not all that clear that the job 
exists. I mention this because when my title says that I’ll be talking about 
‘teaching and witness in the church’, what it really means is that I’m going 
to be talking about doctrine. 
I should also admit at this point that I’m a doctrinal theologian 
specifically in the Church of England – and I really need to plead ignorance 
of the Scottish context. I genuinely don’t know how much what I’m about to 
say about my context will transfer up here; I don’t even know whether 
Anglican doctrinal theologians are as rare a species up here as they are 
south of the border. So I look forward to being better informed – or perhaps 
robustly put in my place – in the Q and A session later. 
 
The ‘Nature of Doctrine’ Debate 
I’m going to begin by asking, What is doctrinal theology? What is it for? 
And, specifically: What is the role of doctrinal theology in the church? The 
answer will turn out to have something to do with teaching and witness, but 
it will take me a little bit of a while to get there. 
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These questions about doctrine have been asked a lot over the past three 
decades or so, in a debate sparked by Lutheran theologian George Lindbeck 
in 1984, in his book The Nature of Doctrine. He’s been followed by various 
others, such as Alister McGrath with The Genesis of Doctrine; Ellen Charry 
with a book on The Pastoral Function of Doctrine; Richard Heyduck with 
The Recovery of Doctrine; Kevin Vanhoozer with The Drama of Doctrine, 
Anthony Thiselton with The Hermeneutics of Doctrine, and Christine 
Helmer with a book on The End of Doctrine.
1
 I am, of course, planning on 
writing my own book, The Something of Doctrine, but if you have any 
bright ideas on what my first noun should be, just let me know afterwards. 
These are all books about doctrines, and about doctrinal theology. By 
‘doctrines’, I simply mean statements of core Christian beliefs, especially 
those found in classic creeds and confessions, or in the doctrinal bases of 
Christian organisations—statements that are normally presented as having 
some kind of authority for Christians, or as faithfully summarising the 
church’s authoritative sources. 
By ‘doctrinal theology’ I mean the processes by which these doctrines 
or their subject matter are elaborated upon, justified, critiqued, and put to 
use, in a wide variety of forms and contexts – especially where those 
                                                 
1
 George A. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age 
(Philadelphia, PA: Westminster, 1984), Alister E. McGrath, The Genesis of Doctrine: A 
Study in the Foundation of Doctrinal Criticism (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1990), Ellen 
T. Charry, By the Renewing of Your Minds: The Pastoral Function of Christian Doctrine 
(New York: OUP, 1997), Richard Heyduck, The Recovery of Doctrine in the Contemporary 
Church: An Essay in Philosophical Ecclesiology (Waco, TX: Baylor, 2002), Kevin J. 
Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine: A Canonical-Lingusitic Approach to Christian 
Doctrine (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2005), Anthony C. Thiselton, The 
Hermeneutics of Doctrine (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2007) and Christine Helmer, 
Theology and the End of Doctrine (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2014). 
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processes are driven primarily by attention to the meaning, implications and 
connections of doctrinal ideas. 
So, doctrines: authoritative statements; doctrinal theology: discussion 
and use of those statements or of their subject matter. Those books that I 
mentioned are books about the promulgation of doctrines, and about the 
pursuit of doctrinal theology – and about both as activities of the church. 
The authors ask: Why are they activities of the church? What relationship do 
these activities – of defining doctrine, of pursuing doctrinal theology – have 
to the truth? to Christian practice? to scripture? to tradition? to experience? 
 
Doctrine is No One Thing 
There is a lot of good stuff in these books, but I have three worries about 
them, and I’m going to work my way to my own more positive statements 
by telling you about these three worries. 
First, at least some of the authors assume that doctrine has a nature – 
that it is one thing. And yet it seems clear to me that there is no one thing 
called doctrine; that there are, in fact, many natures of doctrine, and a 
tangled history of the process by which ‘doctrine’ comes to be construed in 
the various different ways in which we now construe it. 
After all, the moment you start digging in to my definition about 
‘statements of core Christian belief’ with ‘some kind of authority’, 
‘doctrine’ turns out to cover a whole range of kinds of pronouncement, 
made in a variety of contexts for a variety of purposes, with a variety of 
forms of authority. Paul summarises Christian faith in a letter to a distant 
church; Irenaeus sets out the ‘rule of faith’ in a polemic against gnostic 
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hermeneutics; the bishops gathered at Nicaea pronounce on the shape of the 
faith and anathematise its upstart distorters – and so on, and on and on, until 
we’re comparing the forms and functions of the Westminster Confession, 
the Barmen Declaration, and the doctrinal basis of the Evangelical Alliance. 
It’s not clear that those are all the same kind of thing. 
Nor is there one kind of activity called doctrinal theology. We 
sometimes proceed – at least in academic contexts – as if the nature of 
doctrinal theology were singular and obvious. We discuss, say, the doctrine 
of the incarnation, say, and we know that we’re handling a particular 
complex of ideas, and we know roughly how to handle that complex of 
ideas – the sorts of things its appropriate to do with them, the sorts of 
questions its appropriate to ask. And yet we also know that there’s a history 
to the invention of that task. Paul’s summarising of the faith has something 
to do with his distance from the communities to which he is writing, the 
inability to wield charismatic authority from that distance, and the need to 
persuade those communities that they already know all they need to know, 
to decide the questions that beset them (the deposit of the faith they have is 
sufficient for them); Irenaeus’ setting out of the rule of faith is part of the 
invention of the ideas of heresy and orthodoxy, the negotiation of patterns 
of intercommunion, recognition, and exclusion in the diaspora of second-
century Christianity; Nicaea is in part a matter of imperial politics and the 
need for a different kind of public performance of unity – and so on, and on, 
and on. The history of the carving out of the space we can call ‘doctrinal 
theology’ is a rhetorical, polemical, political history – an ecclesial history, a 
pastoral history. 
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And it’s also, very much, a contested history. To pick an Anglican 
example of this, think of what happened with the Oxford Movement in the 
19
th
 Century. Rather obviously, as well as disagreement over particular 
matters of theological substance, there was disagreement over method – 
over the kind of activity that doctrinal theology was supposed to be, and 
about the kind of objects that doctrines were. Participants in these debates 
got trained in different intellectual habits; they used (and published!) 
different libraries of texts from the tradition; they wrote on the whole for 
different periodicals; they worked to different standards of excellence, and 
different moves counted as good arguments for them. The phrase ‘doctrinal 
theology’ meant different things depending on where you stood in that 
debate. 
And that’s just one episode. In the course of the longer history of 
doctrine and doctrinal theology, all the basic questions I mentioned at the 
start – the relationship of doctrinal theology to truth, practice, scripture, 
tradition, experience and so on – were all answered differently in different 
times and places. There are, and there have been, very different intellectual 
traditions that can go by the name of ‘doctrinal theology’, each construing 
the nature of doctrine differently. Doctrine is no one thing – and, insofar as 
they promote unified answers, singular answers, the proposals made by the 
authors I have mentioned are not so much descriptive, as selective and 
prescriptive … and yet the joint between description and prescription is one 
that they mostly leave out of sight. They talk as if they are describing how 
doctrine has always worked. So that’s my first worry. 
 
 6 
Where Does Doctrinal Theology Happen? 
My second worry is rather similar to the first. I worry that it is not always 
clear who is being talked to – or rather, where you’ll find the doctrinal 
theology being discussed, and who is doing it. George Lindbeck himself, the 
initiator of the recent debate, illustrates this all too well. For most of his 
career, Lindbeck was an ecumenist – he was involved in big, mainstream, 
formal ecumenical dialogues, mostly Lutheran–Catholic. He wrote his 
account of doctrine in order to clarify the way it was being handled in those 
ecumenical dialogues; he was writing for other ecumenical dialoguers. And 
yet, he dressed his account up as a general theory of doctrine, addressed to 
nobody in particular; it was an account, he claimed, that should work for 
multiple contexts, multiple denominations, even multiple religions. He 
obfuscates the audience for his arguments. 
It may be more helpful, however, to come at my point another way. 
Consider my own case, and the forms of doctrinal theology (the particular 
practices of doctrinal theology) in which I – as a self-avowed English 
Anglican doctrinal theologian – am involved. I teach doctrinal theology in a 
secular university department, in Durham, but I also teach a session or two 
down the road from that department in Cranmer Hall to Anglican ordinands 
and other ministerial trainees. Then (as some of you now know only too 
well), I am part of the academic leadership for the  Common Awards 
partnership, and have some kind of role in the oversight of academic 
standards for the teaching of doctrine in all the partner institutions. I 
sometimes preach in my local church. I’m a member of the Church of 
England’s Faith and Order Commission, which is in part a successor body 
to its Doctrine Commission; I’m on a panel for the Church  of England’s 
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Board of Education, including a very tangential role in the development of 
some new doctrinally framed teaching materials, that can be used to teach 
about Christianity in primary and secondary schools. And I could go on. 
My point is: it is really not clear to me that any one account of doctrinal 
theology is will cover all these different contexts – university department, 
theological college, local church, Faith and Order Commission, primary 
school, and so on – it is not clear to me that any one account will cover all 
the different practices of deliberation and communication that take place in 
these various contexts. And just as I don’t think that the accounts of doctrine 
I mentioned at the start necessarily do descriptive justice to the variety of  
differing theological traditions, so I don’t think that they necessarily do 
justice to the variety of practices of doctrinal theology, and to the different 
parameters, standards, and needs of those practices. So that’s my second 
worry. 
 
Doctrine and intellectual elitism 
My third worry is rather different. It is sparked off by the recognition that 
there is, in some though not all of these accounts, a tendency towards the 
Jeremiad. That is, there is a tendency to begin by bemoaning loudly the 
terrible state of doctrinal theology, and the terrible state of the church 
brought on by its neglect of doctrinal theology, which has been replaced by 
some kind of laissez-faire relativism, a lukewarm indifference to doctrine. 
These complaints are normally presented as analyses of the situation in 
which the church is now: a matter of current affairs more than history. You 
begin your book by explaining how it is all going to hell in a handbasket, 
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and has been doing over the last few years, but you, the doctrinal 
theologian, are going to solve things. And yet it is pretty clear that people 
have been making the same complaint for decades – indeed, for centuries. I 
can point you to worries about the churches ‘falling away from “organized 
religion,” and with it [their] revolt from “dogmatic theology”’ –  in 1929; or 
to worries about the churches succumbing to the idea that the whole 
development of doctrine is ‘a gigantic monument of human folly, a 
momentous aberration of the human spirit’ – in 1897. Or to John Henry 
Newman complaining that, for many in the church, ‘every man’s view of 
revealed religion [whatever it might be] is acceptable to God, if he acts up 
to it; … [so that] no one view is itself better than another’ – in 1838; 
complaining about the rise of relativisim and the decline of doctrinal 
seriousness. 
And I could go back further still – because this is a perennial pattern in 
the life of my church (and possibly yours too). The underlying structure is 
actually, I think, something like a contrast between (though I don’t like this 
term) folk religiosity and the religiosity of an educated elite: that is, between 
the rather various, rather inarticulate, rather ‘mythical [and] material modes 
of making sense … associated commonly with “the people” at large’ on the 
one hand, and, on the other, ‘the analytic styles of a class that has 
[supposedly] “escaped” from myth’, that prizes the clear intellectual grasp 
and communication of the truths of faith. I’m part quoting here from Rowan 
Williams’ discussion of Richard Hooker’s debate with Puritanism, with 
Hooker siding with ‘the people’ – with all their stubbornly limited, patchy, 
and various grasp of theological truth, against the Puritans, who he sees as 
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seeking a purification of the church by means of sound teaching: a church 
organised around the secure intellectual grasp of theological truths.
2
 
There are many questions to ask about that contrast, but I suggest that 
something like the contrast I have just described – some kind of contrast 
between folk and elite, or ordinary and intellectual religion – is an abiding 
structure of the life of the Church of England; there’s a constantly 
reproduced opposition and interaction between the two sides, visible from 
the sixteenth to the twenty-first centuries. And this perennial structure gets 
embodied in many an individual theologian’s stance, by means of the 
trajectory on which that individual theologian’s training takes them, as it 
plucks them from the midst of the folk, and places them in the very 
institutional factory that sustains intellectual elitism: the university or 
perhaps the seminary. And the typical product of that training is the young, 
normally male theologian, who now wears the tweed jacket or black polo 
neck of academe, and who knows better than the church how the church 
should believe – and who, when older and more regretful, comes to 
Edinburgh to deliver lectures about it all. 
In brief, then, my theory (which I am giving in very broad brush terms) 
is that this biographical trajectory, which involves moves between 
institutions, and between the different kinds of formation offered by those 
institutions, leads to theologians embodying in a certain way a perennial 
sociological distinction shaping the life of the church, and then expressing 
that distinction by means of apparently historical claims: doctrine is 
declining now, and we are in a position to restore it. Doctrine is always 
declining; that’s how it always looks when you have been on that trajectory. 
                                                 
2
 Williams, Rowan, Anglican Identities (London: DLT, 2004), 32–3. 
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And I’m uneasy, therefore, about the expressed desire to renew the 
church by means of restored doctrinal seriousness – at least in some of its 
forms. And why am I so uneasy about this shape? Because, unless very 
carefully handled – and I do think it can be very carefully handled, and it is 
by some – it provides an intellectualist account of church life over against 
the messiness of really existing faith. And yet, I am sure that if I go to my 
church on a Sunday, and because of my intellectual training can be pretty 
confident that I know, say, the doctrine of the Trinity better than anyone 
there – really a lot better – there’s still no interesting sense in which I could 
claim thereby to know God better than them. (And that’s not because I think 
there’s anything wrong with the doctrine of the Trinity.) But by being able 
to manipulate the terms of technical doctrinal theology well, better than 
anyone in the congregation, that doesn’t in itself mean that I know God 
better. If an account of the nature of doctrine can’t do justice to that basic 
hunch (and therefore to the hunch that the role of doctrinal theology can’t be 
to tell people stuff about God that they don’t know, because the doctrinal 
theologian knows God better) – if it can’t do justice to that hunch (and I 
don’t think all of them can) I’m going to be very suspicious of it. 
 
So what is doctrine? 
And all that now brings me, at last, to more positive comments.  I’m going 
to sketch an account of the origin of doctrine and doctrinal theology, and 
I’m going to draw on that to talk about two contexts of doctrinal thinking in 
my church today: story-telling, and decision-making in the context of 
division. I’m going to try to keep in mind the variety of doctrinal traditions 
(my first worry), and the variety of doctrinal practices within each tradition 
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(my second worry), and to avoid an intellectualist account of the life of the 
church (my third worry) – and I’m going (at last!) to bring witness and 
teaching into the frame. 
Let me start with the experience with which Christianity begins: a 
scripture-wrapped, God-shaped experience of the human being Jesus of 
Nazareth, risen as Lord. This experience gives rise to discipleship – to forms 
of community life, and to forms of individual life within and around those 
communities, that respond to this Lord. Or, perhaps better, this experience 
gives rise to the ongoing negotiation of discipleship: ongoing negotiation in 
engagement with scripture, in conversation with tradition and the 
contemporary church, in interaction with the world – as Christians try to 
make enough sense to live by, as disciples. 
Obviously, because it is an ongoing negotiation of discipleship, it 
involves, unavoidably and centrally, reference back to Jesus. That’s why the 
most basic shape of the life of the church can be thought of as witness: as 
life corporate and individual that points to, that responds to and so shows, 
the Lordship of Christ – in Christ-focused worship; in endeavours in 
communal life gathered around him; in mission in his name, and so on. 
Now teaching is a part of this life of witness: in various forms it serves 
this life of witness, informing it, keeping it in shape, enabling and impelling 
the processes of negotiation and of reference or pointing that constitute it – 
and in various forms teaching itself can be a form of witness, precisely 
because witness involves pointing, naming – it involves communicating, 
proclaiming, and confessing Christ. In fact my very rough definition of 
Christian teaching is something like ‘communicating so as to witness and so 
as to shape witness to Christ’. 
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Various practices that we could loosely group under the heading 
‘teaching’ run through this life of Christian witness right from start. We 
have disciples of Jesus preaching to Jewish and then to Gentile audiences, 
defending themselves in trials before the authorities, preaching to those 
already converted, sending letters full of instruction, catechising those 
preparing for baptism, and so on. All sorts of practices of teaching. 
Within this great mess of forms of communication that witness and 
shape witness, there are elements that begin to look specifically like 
doctrinal practices – confessing the name of Jesus in worship, singing 
hymns that articulate the content of the good news, pronouncing ritual 
confessions at the end of catechesis and during baptism, producing flexible 
statements of the rule of faith in the contest between diverse groups 
claiming the name Christian, developing conciliar creeds to police the views 
of bishops, and so on. 
You couldn’t draw a hard line around them and say ‘here’s doctrine’, 
‘here’s wider teaching practice’, ‘here’s the rest of the life of witness’: 
we’re dealing with messy, overlapping, intermingling complexity here, 
which doesn’t admit of such dissection. But in the midst of all this, we do 
see the emergence of a loose set of key ideas around which much of this 
communication’s content swirls – loci that become touchstones for 
comparison, contrast, and argument, and that eventually become articles of 
creeds and confessions. And it is those ideas that we can begin to call 
doctrines. 
Right from the start of this process of emergence, we’re talking about a 
diversity of doctrinal practices. From a very early date, we see at least the 
seeds of differing domains of discourse with their own rules. What are the 
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connections between baptismal confessions and apologetic summaries of the 
faith? What’s the connection between conciliar debate and ordinary 
catechetical teaching? What are the rules of play in each of these cases? But 
all of these doctrinally shaped practices of teaching are there to support and 
extend the life of the church’s witness, the ongoing negotiation of 
discipleship; that is the context in which they make sense, the context in 
which they live. 
 
Practices of story-telling 
Consider, for instance, the many ways in which the life of Christian witness 
involves story-telling. The creed isn’t a story; if you’ll forgive the technical 
term, it’s ‘sort of narrativish, in part’. Christianity isn’t a story; the Christian 
community doesn’t embody a story; people’s lives are not in any 
straightforward sense single stories; experience doesn’t come in exclusively 
story form. But the life of Christian witness does irreducibly involve, among 
many other things, some practices of story-telling. In a variety of contexts, 
Christians tell stories of Jesus, stories of salvation, stories of God’s ways 
with the world. 
Think of such story-telling as a family of practices: preaching, 
children’s talks, other less visible practices of pastoral story-telling, and so 
on – you could probably elaborate the list all afternoon. If you look at those 
practices, you will find a really complex and flexible set of skills, by which 
Christians, in response to the contexts in which they find themselves, 
improvise recognisably Christian stories – drawing on a complex repertoire 
of themes, motifs, plots, characters, settings, and vocabulary in ways that 
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are beyond systematisation. Sometimes it’s done well, sometimes it’s done 
badly, sometimes it’s excruciating – but there’s an awful lot of it out there, 
and a lot of it is sophisticated and complex. Doctrines, in this context, can 
perhaps be thought of as the nodes around which these stories tend to 
revolve. If you could plot all the lines these stories take, you would find a 
vast, unwieldy tangle – but doctrines would be represented by unusually 
intense knots in the midst of it. 
In relation to these specific practices, doctrinal theology doesn’t so 
much set out the one plot of Christian story-telling, as explore these nodes 
around which these stories are circling, learning how the story can thread 
into and out of them. It draws on the history of these practices of story-
telling, the ways that these knots in the tangle have emerged over time; it 
asks how and why Christians have told their stories around them in quite the 
way that they have. It also draws on the ways that these stories are being 
told in the present in all sorts of contexts. And such exploration is 
undertaken, fundamentally, for the sake of feeding back into the process; for 
the sake of ongoing improvisation in such story-telling – to inspire it, to 
shape it, to give the Christians involved access to a richer repertoire of 
moves to make as they tell these stories, and of questions to ask of their 
performance. This is, I think, one of the things going on in a theological 
education institution like the Scottish Episcopal Institute, when doctrine is 
taught – or at least it is one frame with which to think about the power and 
success of doctrinal teaching in a context like SEI. Is it both drawing on past 
and present practice in such story telling, and feeding back, so as to enliven 
and enrich those practices? 
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If it works like this, the doctrinal theologians in question are 
contributing to a set of practices that can be and mostly are fairly healthy 
without them, and whose gaps and failures they probably won’t do that 
much to resolve: doctrinal theologians are not the producers, controllers, or 
saviours of Christian story-telling. But, if they do their job well, they might 
be amongst those who help keep this practice flourishing, and who keep it in 
touch with and recognisable to other participants. They might be playing a 
useful, even if not a determinative part, in keeping these practices of 
teaching going – and so in feeding the life of witness of which these 
practices of teaching are a part. We are useful, but not strictly necessary. 
 
Disagreement and Division 
That is, I hope, an attractive and plausible picture. But I want to focus now 
on a different use of doctrinal theology in the church, which may make for 
gloomier discussion – and that is doctrinal theology’s role in large-scale 
debates, in decision-making in relation to the headline issues that threaten 
the unity of my church and its witness. And to get to this topic, I want to say 
just a little more about the development of doctrine. 
Now there are many complex stories to tell of the process of 
development of doctrine, but all I want to say at this point is that the nature 
of witness, the role of teaching within it, and the development of anything 
that looks like doctrine, are all contested right from the start. The book of 
Acts may present a picture of the disciples one in heart and mind, and 
sharing all things – but the earliest contemporary evidence we have for the 
development of Christianity is a bunch of letters thrown as missiles in 
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battles about rather basic questions of Christian self-definition. The earliest 
texts we have are controversial – and not from controversies between 
central figures and outliers, but between Paul and Peter; we’re not talking 
about a debate between centre and fringe, but arguments right at the centre 
of the life of Christianity in the first century.  
And if we carry the story on from that point, pretty soon we’re dealing 
with ramifying traditions of doctrinal theology – that is, diverging strands of 
intellectual practice, whose proponents pursue differing patterns of 
argument, make sense of different kinds of evidence, stand in differing 
relations to scripture, offer differing accounts of their own development and 
of their connections back to Jesus and the apostles, and so on. 
And from very early on, participants in any one of these intellectual 
traditions, these strands of doctrinal theology, looking backwards within 
their own strand, can see how it has unfolded appropriately, faithfully, even 
with necessity, from the initial deposit of Christian faith – and looking 
across at other people’s traditions they can see only too easily what those 
other traditions miss, and where the evolution of those other traditions looks 
arbitrary rather than necessary. But their opponents on the other side of the 
fence can do just the same in return. On the whole, not many of these 
strands are susceptible to straightforward argumentative defeat; they can all 
sustain themselves argumentatively. 
And this, of course, raises some serious questions for the practice – the 
practices – of doctrinal theology in the church. It raises questions that are 
inherent in the idea of witness to Christ as Lord, as it has been explored in 
the life – the lives – of the Christian church. Acknowledging Christ’s 
lordship involves acknowledgement of something not in one’s own control. 
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It implies a kind of objectivity, a kind of shared reference to something that 
stands over against all of us. Lordship implies obedience in some form. 
Christians therefore can’t get away from the question: in the church’s 
various patterns of witness, are they showing, are they witnessing to the 
same Lord? And that in turn means that, in some form or other, the question 
of whether Christians teach the same things is similarly unavoidable. It is 
not going to go away. 
So, if my earlier point, about story-telling, was about how doctrinal 
theology might support teaching, and thereby support the church’s life of 
witness, this point is about how differences in teaching, disagreements in 
doctrine, might undermine the church’s life of witness. And the problem is 
that the differences between traditions include differences over the very 
criteria by which we might decide on the limits of acceptable diversity – the 
criteria by which we might decide whether we are witnessing to the same 
Lord. And given that doctrinal arguments only make sense within particular 
traditions of reasoning, they are therefore only so much use in tackling 
disagreement between traditions of reasoning – traditions separated 
precisely by what you can appeal to, and in what ways, to settle disputed 
questions . And when I say that they are ‘only so much use’, I really mean 
that they are ‘not much use at all’. 
It’s no surprise, therefore, that the history of Church of England (to say 
nothing of the broader Anglican Communion, or the global church) is not a 
history, on the whole, of arguments being settled by theological debate – or 
of theological solutions adopted and promoted by a central authority – at 
least, not often in such a way that the theological articulation offered by, 
say, a Synod debate or an episcopally-backed report, or whatever, actually 
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does the heavy lifting of establishing a solution that everyone can live with. 
Theological argument seldom solves much, in this kind of context. 
So what can we say in the face of this kind of diversity, which cuts right 
to the heart of our life of witness? Well, just to be perverse, let me offer you 
a solution that doesn’t quite work, even though I’d like it to. Think of me at 
this point as a slightly dodgy second-hand car dealer, about to talk up a car 
that has no real chance of passing its next MOT. 
I could say that what all of us involved in these differing traditions need 
to do, first of all, is acknowledge the same basic overall shape to our life 
together as a church: that it is a witness to Jesus Christ as Lord, as the 
Messiah of Israel, as God’s decisive word to God’s creation. It ought to be 
possible to set out some kind of agreed statement along these lines that will 
secure wide acceptance in the church, and which can therefore provide a 
sort of widescreen backdrop, or a minimal plot within which to situate our 
diverse practices of witness. In fact, some kind of agreed statement like that 
would be needed to enable us to say that, yes, we agree to treat all our 
diverse practices as forms of witness to Christ as Lord, and to allow them to 
be judged as such. 
Such a statement of fundamentals would not, however, be enough to 
settle most detailed questions of practice – it’s simply too broad brush, too 
large-scale a form of agreement. So the second step in this solution, after the 
establishment of this foundational agreement, would simply be to 
acknowledge that we do not have consensus beyond that foundation: we 
have different doctrinal traditions. And we should – according to this 
solution that I’m currently trying to sell you – simply acknowledge this 
diversity. We agree on fundamentals; we disagree on adiaphora – on thinks 
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indifferent or things accessory. That’s what Anglicans do. The pursuit of 
agreement at the level of ideas is therefore not really on the table, and we 
should look instead at the question of practical compossibility. That is, we 
should ask: What different shapes of lived witness can actually, in practice, 
be part of a single communal form of life together? What forms of witness 
are practicably possible alongside one another, intermeshed with one 
another? What forms are practically com-possible? 
Of course, when you pose it like that – we have agreed on fundamentals, 
and we’re now just looking for practical compatibility for the rest – the 
question of what unity and disunity might even mean turns out to be a very 
complex and messy question, that has a messier shape than the question of 
intellectual agreement and disagreement. After all, practical unity is a very 
various and diverse thing. The kind of peaceful and fruitful practical 
coexistence you can have within a single congregation is very different from 
kind of peaceful and fruitful practical coexistence you can have within a 
family of congregations in full formal communion with one another; unity 
means practically different things in those two contexts. And those are, 
again, different from the kind of peaceful and fruitful practical coexistence 
you can have between ecumenical partners. The limits of practical non-
interference differ from the limits of conscience, which differ from the 
limits of active co-operation, which differ from the limits of shared 
teaching. The question of what you’re happy for your money to pay for 
differs from the question of what ministry from you’re willing to accept 
from what bishop, which differs from the question of what effect you think 
the witness of others has on your witness, or of what witness you think is 
given by the very fact of your remaining identifiably a part of the same 
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church as another congregation with which you disagree. These are all 
different questions, which demand different kinds of answers; unity doesn’t 
mean just one thing; it’s a multi-level, multi-strand reality. Finding a 
practical way forward as a church is a matter of negotiating together through 
all that – finding a way forward where all the participants can continue with 
some kind of integrity (as they see it), even though they all have different 
theological maps, and there’s no way that a single theological argument can 
settle the issues consensually. 
So, my proposed solution would start with some shared fundamentals of 
belief, which set the broadest backdrop within which our disagreements take 
place. It would then move on to this question of practical compossibility – 
the complex negotiation of how these disagreements can be lived with in 
practice, peacefully and fruitfully, and bearably (to say no more) for all 
involved. And the third step – can you hear that strange knocking in the 
engine yet, or the wobble in the offside suspension? – the third step would 
simply be to advocate patience: to say that, unsatisfactory as this uneasy 
practical cohabitation might be, this agreement on fundamentals and mess 
of negotiated cooperation on everything else – well, that is all we have, and 
holding together in this way is itself a way of acknowledging the nature of 
the truth to which we witness. 
Unfortunately, as you’ll find out if you buy this car and try to drive it 
away, this solution doesn’t quite work. It remains at least one step too 
intellectually optimistic – and that is precisely because it is a proposed 
theoretical ‘solution’. I have just given you a lecture outlining a solution, 
drawing on a set of concepts in order to articulate that solution. And as such, 
it involves a particular, controversial, construal of how teaching and witness 
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work. It involves a construal of how adiaphora and fundamentals work, and, 
where the boundary is between those two – the things that you can’t change 
and the things that you can. It presents itself as an overview of the field, 
even though it is actually an intervention in it, from one particular point of 
view. That is, it sounds like a general description of our shared situation, but 
it funds itself in practice on coinage that circulates within specific 
intellectual traditions within the church, but which is inevitably less well 
accepted in others – or at least has a very disadvantageous exchange rate. 
This form of advocacy may have some purchasing power, but if I’m 
right that our divisions do not often get solved by theological argument, 
they are unlikely to get solved even by a theological argument about why 
our divisions do not often get solved by theological argument. That’s a neat 
attempt at an end run, but it is unlikely to work; it still leaves solution in the 
hands of the theologians. It proposes yet another solution by means of 
clearly grasped intellectual agreement, even if it is the clearly grasped 
intellectual agreement to downplay the importance of clearly grasped 
intellectual agreement. And we’re not all going to agree on that kind of 
claim. 
Don’t buy this car. 
I don’t however, want to end on that negative note, and abandon every 
element of the proposal I have just been exploring. I’d like to keep hold of 
that picture I sketched of the negotiation of practical compossibility – the 
whole complex, layered nature of the forms of unity that are possible, and 
the messy spectacle of participants using differing – indeed, incompatible – 
maps of the territory as they seek to negotiate a practicable way through it 
together, while keeping various kinds of integrity that matter to them. And 
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I’d like to add to that now the fact that their differing maps mark different 
areas of the territory as non-negotiable – and not in compatible ways. There 
is no consensual map in the background, however bare-boned, on which all 
the individual maps are based.  To say that I am sceptical of a theological 
solution to disagreement and division in the church is simply to admit that 
the negotiation of ways forward in the midst of all that kind of mess aren’t, I 
think, going to proceed by way of overview and consensus. Or, to put it 
another way, and more concretely, they’re not going to be worked out by the 
deployment of winning arguments in some kind of generic public space 
within the church – the kind of space that has become visible in new ways 
online, in the tit-for-tats of twitter, Facebook, the blogosphere – but the kind 
of space that has also long appeared in Synod-as-spectacle, or in the 
exchange of letters with long lists of signatories in the Church Times – the 
spaces of megaphone diplomacy, or the darkling plain on which 
uncomprehending armies clash by night. Those are the kinds of spaces 
within which global solutions are proffered – and inevitably rejected, claims 
about consensus advanced – and withdrawn, theological overviews floated – 
and shot down. I don’t think that in that kind of space, at that kind of level 
of generality, that our way forward as a church is going to be established by 
a winning argument. 
However: the ongoing process of negotiation, the exploration and testing 
of practical compossibility, genuinely fraught and fractious though it might 
be – that negotiation doesn’t only happen, it doesn’t mainly happen, at that 
global level. It happens in all sorts of smaller-scale contexts and processes, 
in numerous differing localities and conversations. It is an awkward dance, 
and the way it evolves is affected by all kinds of thinking being done by all 
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sorts of participants in all sorts of ways. It may not make much sense to 
hope for large-scale intellectual solutions to the whole mess – with one 
intellectual bound, Jack was free – but it does make sense, I think, to hope 
that the ongoing negotiation of the mess might be deepened and enriched 
and informed, in all sorts of smaller-scale but nevertheless serious ways. 
And it is in relation to those smaller-scale possibilities of development 
that there is, I think, useful doctrinal theological work to be done. There’s 
doctrinal theological work to be done on helping people become literate in 
their own traditions of teaching and witness – and in the traditions of others; 
promoting good descriptions of each one’s dynamism, multiplicity, and 
internal questions. There’s doctrinal theological work to be done learning to 
narrate carefully – and generously – the emergence and sustaining and 
interaction of the multiple traditions that we now inherit; there’s doctrinal 
theological work to be done promoting forms of attention to each other’s 
doctrinal claims that sets those claims in the context of past and present 
practice, past and present witness. Without expecting, or promoting the idea 
that such work is likely to solve anything on a grand scale, I do think it can 
make a difference. It can, perhaps, by way of multiple small-scale changes, 
affect the texture, the flow, and – perhaps, in the long run – even the 
outcomes of our larger-scale negotiations, our disagreements, because it can 
change the possibilities of negotiation, for at least some of the negotiators 
involved. I dare to hope that it might therefore be one factor, among many 
others, in allowing us to find new habitable settlements together. Perhaps. 
One final comment. It’s not remotely enough to leave what I have just 
said in the abstract – though I have left myself no time to put that right. I’ll 
just say that we need to think about the particular spaces, the particular 
 24 
practices, within which these kinds of process of mutual education can take 
place, and the actual practices that will constitute them – coming back to the 
point I made early on about the variety of practices and contexts of doctrinal 
theology in the church. The spaces within which this kind of work can take 
place and does take place are very varied, and mostly quite small-scale. But 
they might include, I believe and hope, spaces like the Scottish Episcopal 
Institute. Spaces for learning, for exploration, for mutual challenge – for 
teaching, for growth in witness, for negotiating ways of life together, 
including our disagreements. And – I dare to hope – for richly attentive and 
argumentatively diverse doctrinal theology as one of the things, though only 
one of the things, that might serve the unity, and so the witness, of the 
church. 
 
